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MUNSON PRIZE THESIS.
The term "foreign judgment," as used in the books, applies
indiscriminately to judgments rendered in a foreign country and
those rendered in sister States of the Union, and it is not un-
usual for text-writers to treat the two classes conjointly. The
limits of this paper, however, force us to confine our discussion
to those judgments which are foreign in the stricter sense.
There is an obvious and fundamental distinction between these
and the judgments of a sister State, both in respect of their in-
herent force and of the basis underlying it, which, in the case of
the former, is comity, absolute reciprocity, or individual obliga-
tion, and, in the case of the latter, a provision in the federal
Constitution and congressional enactments in pursuance thereof.
Before the Revolution our various colonies, though in many
respects so intimately connected, were by the common law
deemed foreign to each other, and the courts of one applied to
the judgments rendered by the tribunals of the others, the rule
then prevailing in England regarding foreign judgments, hold-
ing them to be butprima fade evidence of debt and not to possess
the dignity of a record. Clearly, among a people so closely knit
by ties of blood and common interest, such a doctrine must be
fraught with inconvenience, and prove a great impediment to
commercial intercourse. The logical outcome was a number of
statutes, the earliest passed in Massachusetts in 1773, providing
that the judgments of the courts of adjacent colonies should be
unimpeachable on their merits.' When, by the Articles of Con-
federation, the colonies were united in one nation of States, it
was provided:' "Full faith and credit shall be given, in each of
these States, to the records, acts and judicial proceedings of the
courts and magistrates of every other State"; and later, by our
present Constitution,' it was enacted: "Full faith and credit
shall be given in each State to the public acts, records and judi-
I Hilton v. Guyot, i59 U. S. 113; Bigelow on Estoppel (5th Ed.) p. 266.
A Art. 4, Sec. 3. s Art. 4, Sec. i.
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cial proceedings of every other State, and Congress may by gen-
eral laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and
proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof." In pursu-
ance of the power thus granted the first Congress under the
Constitution, sitting in 179o, after prescribing the manner of
authentication, enacted that "the said records and judicial pro-
ceedings, authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and
credit given to them in every court of the United States as .hey
have by law or usage in the courts of the State from whence the
said records are or shall be taken."' The supplementary act of
March, 27, 1804, regnacting these provisions and adding further
directions concerning attestation, is made to apply to "the Terri-
tories of the United States and the countries subject to the juris-
diction of the United States."
By these constitutional and legislative provisions, all consider-
ations of comity, reciprocity, utility and personal obligation,
which render the questions involving foreign judgments so diffi-
cult and uncertain, are swept away, and in their place is erected
the inflexible and determinate "supreme law of the land."
The courts have decided that the record of a judgment rendered
by a duly constituted tribunal of a sister State is a record in the
true sense of the word, to an action on which nu tIe? record alone
is the appropriate general issue;' that such a judgment merges
the original cause of action,' and that it has all the force as evi-
dence or as an estoppel that it would have where given. Even
the plea of fraud is not generally available,' unless, perhaps,
when permitted at home,' or when the suit is in equity to re-
strain proceedings at law.9 But except so far as they are by the
Constitution united for national purposes, the several States of
the Union still stand toward one another in the relationship of
independent sovereignties; so that, "notwithstanding that pro-
vision [Const., Art. 4, Sec. i] and the statutes passed to enforce
it, the jurisdiction of a State court whose judgment is brought
4 Rev. Stat. U. S., See. 905.
Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, (U. S.) 481.
'Bank of U. S. v. Merchants Bank, 7 Gill. 415.
Christmas "v. Russell, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 290.
8 Hamptdn '. McConnell, 3 Wheat. (U. S.) 234; Hanley V. Donoghue, 116
U. S. 1, 4; Burras v,. Bidwell, 3 Woods (U. S.) 5.
' Pearce z. Olney, 2o Conn. 544. Under the modem code practice, such
equitable defenses may be interposed in an action at law (Amer. and Eng. Enc.
of Law, lit. Judgments, p. r49 f.).
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in question in another State is always open to inquiry. In that
respect, every State court is to be regarded as a foreign court. '0
I.
i. In order that the record of a foreign judgment may be re-
ceived as competent evidence in our courts, it must be duly
authenticated. This is a technical matter into which we shall
not enter any further than to say, that it is usual and proper to
introduce a copy exemplified under the great seal of the State,
or under the seal of the foreign court, in which case, the seal
itself must be proved to be genuine by evidence aliunde, or the
copy may be proved under oath by one who has compared it
with the original. The seals of courts of Admiralty, however,
will be judicially noticed, they "being the courts of the civilized
world."'  And it is said that the "exemplification will be
deemed prima fade correct.""
Furthermore, though there will be a general presumption in
its favor, the record must be fair on its face, and free from uncer-
tainty as to what it professes to decide. Ambiguities will not
be removed by argument and inference.' In the case first cited
(involving a decree of forfeiture rendered by a foreign prize-
court), Justice Story said: "If the sentence be ambiguous or in-
determinate as to the facts on which it proceeds, or as to the
direct grounds of condemnation, the sentence ought not to be
held conclusive, or the courts of other countries put to the task
of picking out the threads of argument or of reasoning or recital
in order to weave them together so as to give force or consist-
ency or validity to the sentence." A patent ambiguity on the
face of the record would be fatal,1 " but where the record is
silent, parol evidence is competent to show what points were
passed upon," as may also be shown the practice and procedure
of the foreign court." Moreover, it ought, as matter of precau-
tion, if not of strict regularity, to appear that the foreign court
10 Fisher v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 9i-ioS; Hatch v'. Spofford, 22 Conn. 485;
Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 457, 461; Grover & Baker Mach. Co.
v. Radcliffe, 137 U. S. 287, 294, 298.
11 L. Greenl. Evid., Secs. 5, 514; Wharton Conflict of Laws, See. 789 et
seg.; Story Conflict of Laws, Sec. 641.
12 Woodbridge v. Austin, 2 Tyler (Vt.) 364, 366.
18 Bigelow on Estoppel (5th Ed.), p. 249; Bradstreet v. Ins. Co., 3 Sumn.
(U. S.) 6oo; Robinson v. Jones, 8 Mass. 536.
1 aBigelow on Estoppel (5th Ed.) 250.
14 Merchants Bank v. Schulenburg, 48 Mich. 102.
15 Fisher v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91.
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had duly acquired jurisdiction, and that regular proceedings
were had; for there are cases going so far as to hold that, if it be
not shown on the face of the record that all the necessary steps
to this end have been complied with, it will not be received even
asprmafade evidence." It is said that "when the record of a
foreign judgment in rem is silent in regard to the matters which
constitute jurisdiction, jurisdiction will not be presumed,'" and
it has been held that in order to bind strangers, the grounds of a
decision of condemnation in a court of Admiralty must be stated
in the record itself.18
Finally, we should say, that if it be clear by the record that
any of the several essentials to the validity of the foreign judg-
ment or decree hereinafter to be stated do not exist, it will be
valueless as evidence and will be treated as a nullity.
2. A judgment or decree rendered in a foreign land has
never been awarded the high character of a record. Hence
there is no extinguishment or merger 19 of the original cause of
action, and the successful plaintiff who desires to reassert his
claim in another jurisdiction has the option of relying for his
evidence on the record of the former adjudication, or of disre-
garding that and entering into the merits de novo. This has
always been the rule in England, and was several times de-
clared by the courts of Texas prior to its annexation to the
United States.2 It is also so held throughout the Union, with
the single exception that in Louisiana, under the Code,the origi-
nal cause of action is regarded as merged in the foreign judg-
ment.2" This absence of merger is due to the fact that the
plaintiff has not by his foreign judgment acquired any higher
remedy in our own courts than he had before. The right to
issue execution, in the case of domestic judgments, would render
16 Sawyer v'. Ins. Co., 12 Mass. 29r; Bradstreet v. Ins. Co.. 3 Sumn. (U.
S.) 6oo; Bigelow on Estoppel (5th Ed.) 251.
17 Bigelow on Estoppel (5th Ed.) 251, citing Com. v. Blood., 97 Mass. 538,
and the Griefswald, Swabey 430. Nevertheless, it must be added that the
tendency of modern decisions is to treat duly exemplified foreign judgments,
bearing nothing to suggest distrust, as being entitled to the jirimafacie pre-
sumption that they were given by a duly constituted tribunal acting within its
lawful authority.
18 Dalgleish v]. Hogson, 7 Bing. 495, 504.
19 Smith ii. Nicholls, 5 Bing. N. C. 208; Bank of Australasia v. Nias, x6
Q- B. 71*7.
2o Frazier v'. Moore, ix Texas 755.
9 'N. Y., L. E. & W. R. Co. v. McHenry, 17 Fed. Rep. 414; Jones v.
Jamison, xi La. Ann. 35.
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a second suit on the original demand wholly superfluous and,
hence, indicative of bad faith and contrary to public policy; but
no such remedy exists in favor of foreign judgments, for here
the party is compelled to have recourse to his action, in which
the former judgment can, in any event, figure only as evidence.2
But if the plaintiff elect so to declare on the merits again, he
may nevertheless employ the record of the former judgment as
evidence of the strength and extent of his claim, without making
any formal allegation in regard to it."
The form of action on the judgment may be either debt, for
the liquidated sum adjudged to be due, or assumsit, on the im-
plied promise to satisfy the obligation raised by such adjudica-
tion. 4 It is unnecessary to allege in the declaration that the
court had jurisdiction, or that it was regularly constituted, or
that the proceedings were properly conducted, for all this (pro-
vided the record itself be regular), will be presumed, until the
contrary is established.' And where, in accordance with the
form provided in one of our modern Practice Acts, the com-
plainant merely alleges that the judgment was "duly" recov-
ered, this implies .that the suit was conducted in due course of
law, "which necessarily involves reasonable notice to the de-
fendant of the institution and nature of the action, given (unless
this be waived), if he be a non-resident, by personal service
within the jurisdiction, and a fair opportunity to be heard before
a tribunal of competent jurisdiction," and also that a trial or
hearing was had."
3. Having adverted to the main points of procedure which
must govern one who seeks to enforce in the courts of one coun-
try a demand already passed upon by the courts of another, we
come now to consider the defenses by which such an action may
be met.
And first, if the plaintiff who has recovered in a foreign court
decide to sue a second time on his original cause of action, he
waives all advantage of estoppel that might have accrued to him
from the prior adjudication, and opens the door for the defend-
2Smith v. Nicholls, 5 Bing. N. C. 208.
23 N. Y., L. E. & W. R. Co. vz. McHenry, 17 Fed. Rep. 414.
"4Henderson v'. Henderson, 6 Q. B. 288; Grant v. Eastern L. R., 13 Q.
B. Div. 302; Mellin vz. Horlick, 3i Fed. Rep. 865.
2 5Gunn v. Peakes, 36 Minn. I77; Snell v. Faussatt, i Wash. C. C. (U. S.)
271; Robertson v. Struth, 5 Q. B. 941; Henderson v. Henderson, 6 Id. 288;
Cowan v. Braidwood. i . & Cr. 882, 892-895; 2 Wharton on Evid., Sec. 8o4
and cases cited.
36 Fisher v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 9i.
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ant to contest the merits anew." There being no merger, the
foreign judgment cannot of course in such case be set up as a
bar, as could be done in the case of a domestic judgment,8 but it
would seem that the record may be exhibited as marking the
limit of the second recovery,"' and a plea of judgment recovered
and satisfaction thereof will be a good defense to the action."
But the pendency in a foreign court of another action for the
same cause will not prevent an action here,"' for that circum-
stance is not available for a defense even as between our sister
States.
But if, in such case, the foreign judgment was in favor of the
defendant, he is entitled to plead it in bar, and, if a final adjudi-
cation of a competent court having jurisdiction in the cause and
not misled by fraud, it will serve as a complete exceplio rei
judicatac in his favor. ' In pleading such a judgment, however,
by way of justification or estoppel, it seems that the allegations
are governed by a far more stringent rule than that obtaining
in respect of declarations, and that it must be made clearly to
appear, by express averments, that there existed all matters nec-
essary to confer jurisdiction upon the foreign court, and that
'2 Wharton on Evid., Sec. 8o5.
38 Wood v. Gamble, zi Cush. (Mass.) 8.
29 Smith v. Nicholls, 5 Bing. N. C. 208; dictum of Tindal, C. J. See also
The Propeller East, 9 Benedict 76.
SO Barber v. Lamb, 29 L. J., C. P. 234.
31 Cox v. Mitchell, 7 C. B., N. S. 55; Russell v. Field, Stewart's Can.
Rep. 558.
"2 Phillips v. Hunter, 2 H. B1. 402, 4IO; Ricado vt. Garcias, 12 Cl. & Fin.
368; Bigelow on Estop. (5th Ed.) 313. The reasonableness of this distinction
which awards to a judgment for the defendant the force of an estoppel, but
none to a judgment the other way, has been doubted. It is thus defended by
a well-known writer: "The distinction, bearing in mind the fact that the
doctrine of merger has no application, we conceive to be this: Any partymay
waive an advantage in his own favor, provided he does not thereby interfere
with another's rights. The plaintiff waives such an advantage when he elects
to bring a fresh suit upon the original cause of action, and this without injury
to the rights of the defendant. He risks losing his case without the power, it
would seem, of proving a larger claim than the amount for which the former
judgment was rendered. The reason why he could prove no more than the
sum recovered in the foreign suit, is that this would be to discredit the for-
eign judgment upon the merits; and this could not be done against the objec-
tion of the defendant, as we have seen. It is quite clear that though the
plaintiff waives his rights, he does not endanger those of the defendant."
Bigelow on Estop., p. 313. It seems doubtful how far this rule would be
affected by the doctrine of reciprocity recently enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Hilton v. Guyot, x59 U. S. 113. See infra.
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the judgment there was a final one upon the identical issue
sought to be litigated anew.13
Inasmuch as the foreign judgment is not deemed to give rise
to a record or specialty obligation, the appropriate general issue
to an action founded upon it is nil debet, or non assumpsit, as the
case may be, and never nut tiel record.3Y
4. The statute of limitations of the forum may be specially
pleaded in bar,' inasmuch as that appertains to the remedy, but
a stay of execution granted in the foreign courts will not impair
the efficacy of the judgment when employed in litigation here,
nor will the pendency of an appeal, even where, by the foreign
law, it operates as such a stay; but the domestic court may, if
requested, grant a corresponding stay to await the outcome of
the proceedings abroad."
5- We shall presently have occasion to discuss those matters
which are essential to the validity of a foreign judgment. It
would be a mere truism to state that the absence of these may
be shown to nullify the force of the judgment in an action. If
fraud be set up, the facts must be alleged with great particu-
larity." And where the jurisdiction of the foreign court is
assailed, the pleading must be special, and must carefully nega-
tive every circumstance or state of facts by which jurisdiction
might, by any possibility, have been rightfully entertained;
otherwise it will be declared bad on demurrer.38
II.
Hitherto our attention has been directed to foreign judg-
ments solely with regard to matters of procedure, except so far
as the question of their force and validity is inseparably in-
volved in that consideration. , Such matters, touching the
remedy alone, are to be regulated wholly by the lexfori. 9" But
33 Taylor on Evid., Sec. 1548; Frayes v,. Worms, io C. B. N. S. 148. But
see the language of Earle, C. J., in Barber v. Lamb, 29 L. J. C. P. 234.
"4Walker v. Witter, Doug. Rep. I; Chitty P1. 485; Bissel v. Briggs, 9
Mass. 462. In Bischoff v. Wethered, 9 Wall (U. S.) 812, the plea was nultiel
record; but this was unnoticed by the court, the decision proceeding upon
another ground.
"5 Story Conf. of Laws, Sec, 582a (8th Ed.); Don v. Lippmann, 5 CL &
Fin. i. 19-2i; McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 312.
" See Wharton Conf. of Laws, Sec. 8o5.
37Ritchie v. McMullen, 59 U. S. 235.
38 Hill v. Mendenhall, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 453; 2 Tayloron Evid., See. 154o,
and cases cited.
"9 Story Conf. of Laws, See. 556.
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turning now to the effect of foreign judgments as adjudications
upon the rights of individuals, we find ourselves entering into
the province of private international law. It is not our design,
however, to make any exhaustive examination of the decisions
of foreign tribunals or the opinions of the publicists; we pur-
pose to limit ourselves to a light sketch of what the law of
foreign judgments is, as discovered and declared by the courts
of this country and of England, and of the grounds upon which
it professes to be based.
What, then, is the force of a judgment recovered in a foreign
land? And how may it be attacked?
x. It may be stated generally that the courts of England ana
of this country will not lend their aid to enforce a judgment,
whether in rem or in personam, that was brought about through
treachery and fraud. To hold a contrary view would be to force
Justice to prostitute herself to the vile purposes of chicanery
and corruption. The wise maxim, Interest rezpublicoe ut sit finis
Zitium, has its limitations, and they are reached when to apply
it would be to turn courts into tools of covin, and accomplish
rank injustice. So we find the books full of dicta to the effect
that foreign judgments may be impeached for fraud."9 Yet it is
not so clear of what sort this fraud must be. It has never been
doubted that any deception practiced dehars the proceedings
themselves, by which a party was defrauded of his natural right
to a full and fair trial of the merits of the controversy, would
render the judgment or sentence a nullity. Examples of such
fraud are, corruption of the presiding judge, or bribery of wit-
nesses to disobey a subpoena, or entering judgment through
treachery of counsel on the opposite side " or through collusion
with parties joined with the one injured, or taking judgment by
40 Ochsenbein v. Papelier, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 695, 698; Messina v. Petro-
chino, L. R. 4 P. C. 144; Bank v. Nias, x6 Q. B. 7z7, 735; Price v. Dewhurst,
8 Sim. 279; Hilton v. Guyot. 159 U. S. 113; Ritchie v. McMullen, Idem. 235;
Fisher v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91; 2 Taylor onEvid., Sec. 1533; Bigelowon Estop.,
(5th Ed.) 254; Black on Judgments, Sec. 844; Story on Conflict of Laws, Secs.
592. 597, 6o8; 2 Wharton on Evid., Sec. 803. In an early Connecticut case,
however, involving a sentence of condemnation, passed by a foreign court of
Admiralty, the court said: "The court are of opinion that such a sentence
cannot thus be called in question, but must remain in full force until avoided
in some regular mode, in the country where it passed." Stewart vz. Warner, I
Day (Conn. 1803) 142, 148. But it did not appear that the fraud there set np
had affected in any way the decision of the foreign court.
41 United States v. Flint, U. S. C. C. Cal. 1876. See Hunt v. Blackburn,
128 U. S. 464, 470.
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default in breach of an agreement to discontinue suit.2 In such
cases, there would be no real cause, no real issue, trial or judg-
ment;4 but the whole of the proceedings, from start to culmina-
tion, would be an utter sham-a mere parody on justice. To
reinvestigate this species of fraud is clearly not "to show that
the court was mistaken," but to show "that they were misled,"
within the rule laid down in the celebrated opinion of Chief-Jus-
tice DeGrey, in the Duchess of Kingston's case."
But of late years there have been in England several express
'decisions on this subject which seem greatly to extend the doc-
tFine previously advocated by the courts, holding that foreign
judgments (and, indeed, it would seem, domestic judgments),
may be impeached, if obtained by suppression of evidence and
by fraudulent testimony, even though that very matter had been
passed upon by the foreign court.' In the case of Abouloff v.
Oppenheimer, first cited, (which was a suit on a judgment ren-
dered by a Russian court in an action analogous to our replevin),
Lord Justice Brett said:
"I will assume that in the suit in the Russian court the
plaintiff's fraud was alleged by the defendants and that they
gave evidence in support of the charge. I will assume even
that the defendants gave the very same evidence that they pro-
pose to adduce in this action; nevertheless, the defendants will
not be debarred at the trial of this action from making the same
charge of fraud and from adducing the same evidence in support
of it. * * * It has been contended that the same issue
ought not to be tried in an English court which was tried in the
Russian courts; but I agree that the question whether the Rus-
sian courts were deceived never could be an issue in an action
tried before them."
In the case of Fisher v. Fielding, recently decided by the
Supreme Court of Connecticut, this English doctrine is lucidly
explained by Judge Baldwin, in the following language:
"In such case [claim of fraud] the merits may be re-tried, not
to show that the foreign court came to a wrong conclusion, but
that it was fraudulently misled into coming to a wrong conclu-
42 Ochsenbein v. Papelier, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 695; Pearce v. Olney, 2o Conn.
544; i Bigelow on Fraud, 88 n.
43 See Fisher v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 9!.
44 2 Smith L. C., 784, 794.
45 Abouloff v. Oppenheimer (1882) L. R., zo Q. B. Div. 295, 305, 3o8, fol-
lowed and acted on in Vadala v. Lawes (i89o) L. R., 25 Q. B. D. 3zo, and Crozat
v. Brogdon (1894) 2 Q. B. 3o.
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sion. If the triers are convinced that the foreign judgment
should have been rendered on the merits the-other way, but still
do not find that there was fraud, the defense fails."
These decisions, apparently, introduce a new and important
principle into the doctrine of resjudicata in England, not only in
respect of foreign judgments, but in respect of domestic judgments
as well. And they have not escaped severe crititism, both in
this country and at home." Assuming, for the sake of the argu-
ment, that the judgment of a competent foreign tribunal, hav-
ing the requisite jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, is
to be regarded as conclusive on the merits, it would seem that
the doctrine goes very far. Fraud is alleged in an action; evi-
dence is brought forward in support of the allegation and against
it; the issue thus raised is considered and passed upon by the
court; we fail to perceive why such a decision is not upon the
merits as fully as would be a decision concerning the validity of
an instrument or the existence of a contract. If the court was
competent to decide as to whether or not there was a contract,
it would be equally competent to determine upon the existence
of fraud. The distinction sought to be drawn appears, at first
sight at least, to be subtle and metaphysical, rather than prac-
tical. In the case of Hilton v. Guyot,'7 the Supreme Court of
the United States expressly abstained from passing an opinion
concerning the correctness of this view, and it is difficult to see
how they could uphold it consistently with the rule hitherto
adhered to by that court in regard to domestic judgments."8 In
Vance v. Burbank, just cited, Mr. Chief-Justice Waite said:
"It has been settled that the fraud in respect to which relief
will be granted in this class of cases must be such as has been
practiced on the unsuccessful party, and prevented him from
exhibiting his case fully to the department, so that it may pro-
perly be said that there has never been a decision in a real con-
test about the subject-matter of inquiry. False or forged docu-
ments even are not enough, if the disputed matter has actually
been presented to or considered by the appropriate tribunal."
46 See Van Fleet on Collateral Attack, Sec. 558; Bigelow on Estop. (sth
Ed.), 307; Pigott on Foreign Judgments (2d Ed.), io6 et seq.; 6 Law Quar.
Rev., Eng. 460.
47 159 U. S. 113.
48 United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61, 64; Vance v. Burbank, ioz
U. S. 514, 519; Steel v. Smelting Co., ro6 U. S. 447, 453; Moffat v,. United
States, 1i2 U. S. 24, 32; Marshall v. Holmes, I4i U. S. 589; see also Green v.
Green, 2 Gray(Mass.) 36i; Ross v,. Wood, 70N. Y. 8.
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According to this view, the test is whether the defense was,
or could have been, put in issue at the former trial. If so, relief
must be sought in a motion for a new trial, or in some other
direct proceeding.
The case of Christmas v. Russell, [5 Wall (U. S.) 290] decides
that fraud is no defense to an action at law on a judgment of a sis-
ter State, on the ground that it will not avail (at law) to impeach a
domestic judgment. "It is, however, an equitable bar to its
enforcement, just as it is in case of a domestic judgment. A
judgment may be good at law, and yet equity deem it against
conscience for the plaintiff to stand upon his legal rights. In
such a case it is because the judgment is good at law that equit-
able relief is granted."",
We do not understand the case last quoted as approving the
doctrine of Abouloff v. Oppenheimer, but, on the contrary, as
repudiating it. Defendant had alleged that plaintiffs, well
knowing that he was not personally liable for their claim,
had nevertheless sued him personally to embarrass him and pre-
vent a fair opportunity to defend, and had thereby sought an
unfair advantage over him. The court, however, said:
"In Pearce v. Olney,49"a these principles governed the decis-
ion: An injunction was granted on account of a fraud as to a mat-
ter which could not have been put in issue in the New York suit.
An injunction was refused, on account of a fraud as to a matter
which could have been put in issue in the New York suit. In
the case at bar, by force of the Practice Act, equitable defenses
could be pleaded by way of answer, but the defendant had no
equity, because the question of his indebtedness to the plaintiffs,
if it was to be contested, should have been put in issue before
the English court," thus apparently applying the rule as to sister
State judgments to a foreign judgment, and placing the question
of fraud raised (if the allegation above referred to was considered
as raising such a question), in the same category with other
defenses on the "merits."
In England it seems that there is no distinction as respects
fraud, between legal and equitable defenses. In a case pre-
cisely similar in its facts to Pearce v. Olney, the Chancellor said
that the rule laid down in the Duchess of Kingston's case ap-
plied to courts of law and equity alike, and refused to restrain
the action at law on the ground that the legal remedy was full
4' Fisher v. Fielding 67 Conn. 9z; x Bigelow on Fraud, 88 n.
4962o Conn. 544.
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and adequate; and this decision was expressly declared to be
uninfluenced by the new procedure permitting equitable de-
fenses in legal actions.4 b
2. If a foreign judgment is to possess any validity before our
tribunals, it must have proceeded from a court having competent
authority to sit as such, with jurisdiction of the cause, the subject-
matter, and the parties."
"In order that a judgment may be relied on as res judicata,
it must have been one of a legally constituted court. It is of the
very root of the idea of the right of the state to settle the dis-
putes of individuals that the machinery employed for the pur.
pose should itself be constituted according to law. ""
This is true of our domestic judgments; a fortiori is it true
of judgments given in a foreign land. A party, (at least if he be
not the one who sought the foreign jurisdiction), is in no way
estopped to dispute the authority of the foreign tribunal, and the
validity of its organization and constitution." We have seen,
however, that if there be nothing suspicious upon the face of
the record, a presumption will be indulged in favor of the legal.
ity of the tribunal, and the judgments of a de facto court would
be respected, for the same reason that gives them validity at
home." But no presumption of due constitution will exist where
it appears that the court is one of an extraordinary kind, or of
special jurisdiction.
The question of jurisdiction, its acquisition and extent, is a
subject far too broad and intricate to be discussed with any
degree of plenitude in an essay so superficial as this must neces-
sarily be. Viewed from our standpoint, it is a question which
has received but an imperfect answer from the courts.
Jurisdiction may be acquired in one of four chief ways: First,
by possession of the subject-matter or res, entitling the court
to pronounce a judgment in rem.; secondly, by service upon
the party defendant within the jurisdiction of the court of
actual notice of the action; thirdly, by his voluntary appearance
49b Ochsenbein v,. Papelier, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 695.
I0 Rose v. Himley, 4 Cranch. (U. S.) 241, 269; Storyon Conft. of Laws,
See. 586; Bigelow on Estop., 251.
51 Bigelow on Estop., 61.
5 Black on Judgments, Sec. 821; Cucullu v. Ins. Co., 16 Am. Dec. '94;
Snell v. Faussatt, i Wash. C. C. (U. S.) 271; The Griefswald, Swabey 430;
The Flad Oyen, i Ch. Rob. 135; Elliott v. Piersol, x Pet. (U. S.) 328, 340.
58 Black on Judgments, Sec. 82X; Bank of North Amer. v. McCall, 4 Binn.
(Pa.) 371.
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therein, and fourthly, by constructive notice, through publica-
tion or otherwise."
Over all property, whether real or personal, situate within its
limits, the jurisdiction and dominion of a State, (except so far as
restrictions are ex comitate allowed), are exclusive and absolute.
It may prescribe the methods of its devolution and transfer,
subject it to execution and forfeiture, or in any other manner
operate upon it in accordance with its domestic laws, and the
title thus conferred, or the changes thus effectuated, will be
recognized and respected in every other jurisdiction.' On the
other hand, any attempt on the part of one sovereignty to bind
with its process or decrees property lying within the boundaries
of another, would be absolutely nugatory and void. Therefore,
a foreign judgment in rem or quasi in rem, whether it decide the
title to a chattel, as in the case of the condemnation of a vessel
in a court of admiralty, or the status of an individual, as in the
case of a divorce, will be disregarded, if it appear that the sub-
ject-matter adjudicated upon was without the territorial limits of
the foreign country or without the special jurisdiction of the
tribunal that tried the cause."
"The inconveniences of an opposite course would be innu-
merable, and would subject immovable [and, we add, movable]
property to the most distressing conflicts arising from opposing
titles, and compel every nation to administer almost all laws
except its own in the ordinary administration of justice.-o'
But the court of chancery, provided it have jurisdiction of
the parties, may act upon their consciences, (which is a euphe-
mistic expression meaning threatened confinement in the com-
mon jail!), and thus indirectly, by a decree purely inpersonam,
affect land lying in a foreign country, either to the extent of its
entire disposition or with liens and burdens. 8 This has fre-
54 'Considered from an international point of view, jurisdiction, to be right-
fully exercised, must be founded either upon the person being within the ter-
ritory, or upon the thing being within the territory; for otherwise there can be
no sovereignty exerted, upon the known maxim. Extra territoriam jus
dicentihi;une non jaretur. * * * On the other hand, no sovereignty can
extend its process beyond its own territorial limits to subject either persons or
property to its judicial decisions." Story on Confl. of Laws, See. 559.
55 Idem, Sees. 550, 555, 557.
-8 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 74.
57 Story Conf. of Laws, See. 555.
B8 Idem, Sec. 544.
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quently been done in both England and America." The doc-
trine, however, should be confined within narrow boundaries,
and "must be strictly limited to those cases where the relief
decreed can be entirely obtained through the parties' personal
obedience; if it went beyond that, the assumption would be not
only presumptuous but ineffectual."" And it may be matter of
grave doubt how far such decrees would be respected by a court
acting under a system of jurisprudence whose genius differed
greatly from that of our own.'1
Every sovereign nation, having the sole custody of the lives,
liberty and property of all within its dominions, whether citizens
or foreigners, may by its laws prescribe through what means
their interests shall be brought before its courts for adjudica-
tion." Dispensing with the personal notice, held so dear by the
common law, its local policy may provide a purely constructive
service, by publication or otherwise, which shall be deemed suffi-
cient notice for all intents and purposes, and thus, without his
day in court, and in utter ignorance of the fact that his rights
are being assailed, a party may be forever precluded from dis-
puting the subsequent proceedings, because the legislative will
has said it shall be so. But this constructive process can never,
as regards non-resident foreigners, confer jurisdiction for
international purposes. Such proceedings, if not absolutely
shocking and contrary to natural justice, can at least find no
place in the common jurisprudence of the civilized world. It
may then be laid down as a general principle of private interna-
tional law, that no man, if he be not a citizen, or in some way
owing allegiance to the State, will be held bound inpersonam by
the judgment of a foreign tribunal in a suit whereof he had no
personal notice served upon him, in the jurisdiction, unless he
waived the same or voluntarily appeared in the action. This
necessarily follows as a corollary from the axiomatic proposition
heretofore stated, that within its own territorial limits the
authority of every sovereign State is supreme. And so it has
been expressly decided by the Supreme Court of the United
59 Penn v. Lord Baltimore, i Ves. 444; Massie v,. Watts, 6 Cranch. (U. S.)
148, 158; Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444; Keyser vz. Rice, 47 Md. 203.
60 Westlake's Inter. Law, Art. 65; Story Conf. of Laws, Sec. 545; Whar-
ton Conf. of Laws, Sec. 288, et seq.; Bispham's Eq., See. 366.
61 Wharton Conf. of Laws, Secs. 288, 290, 80g. That such a decree will
be enforced as between England and Ireland, see Houlditch v. Donegal, 2 CL,
& F. 470.
62 Story on Conf. of Laws, Sec. 541.
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States and the Courts of England," and, indeed, would seem
self-evident on its face. The effect of such a judgment would
be purely local." The question, however, is complicated by
other considerations. The courts of England have several times
respected constructive service in cases where the party owed a
general or qualified allegiance to the sovereignty wherein judg-
ment was rendered against him, such allegiance being deemed
to impose an obligation to conform to the determination of the
court. Thus, in Douglas v. Forrest," it was said by Lord
Chief-Justice Best that "a natural-born subject of any country,
quitting that country, but leaving property under the protection
of its laws, even during his absence owes obedience to those
laws, particularly where those laws enforce a moral obliga-
tion;" and, in Becquet v. MacCarthy," Lord Tenterden went
even farther and upheld a judgment rendered in the Island of
Mauritius against a party who, though once resident.there, had
departed the jurisdiction before the action was begun, on the
ground that process had been served on the Procurator-General
who, by the law of the Island, was bound to take care of the
interests of such absent party, and that it was to be presumed
that the officer did his duty. These cases, however, have been
criticized, (if not in effect overruled), in the more recent decis-
ions of Don v. Lippman and Schibsby v. Westenholz;"' and in
the latter case the following conditions were suggested as con-
ferring jurisdiction without personal notice. When the defen-
dant was, at the time of the judgment, a citizen of the foreign
country, or resident there and owing a temporary allegiance at
the time the suit began, or (possibly) at the time the obligation was
contracted, or where he had himself sought the foreign tribunal
as plaintiff. The court expressly left open the question whether
a party would be bound, who had been forced to come in and
defend in order to protect his property, and very much doubted
whether the mere existence of property in the foreign country
would be sufficient basis of jurisdiction to warrant a judgment
in personam."
To what extent these suggestions would be adopted by our
courts it is impossible to say in the absence of direct adjudica-
63 Bischoff v. Wethered, 9 WalL (U. S.) 812; Schibsby v. Westenholz, L.
R., 6 Q. B. 155.
"i Story Conf. of Laws, Sec. 546.
a' 4 Bing., 686, 702. 66 2 B. & Ad. 951.
67 5 C1. Fin. 21; L. R., 6 Q. B. x55.
68 But see Voynet v. Barret, 54 L. J., Q. B. 521.
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tion. It seems reasonable at least that a citizen should be held
bound by any kind of service authorized by the laws of his coun-
try. But in Webster v. Reid 9 the court says:
"These suits were not a proceeding in rem against the land,
but in personam against the owners of it. Whether they all re-
sided within the territory or not does not appear, nor is it a
matter of any importance. No person is required to answer in
a suit on whom process has not been served or whose property
has not been attached."
It is sometimes sought to bind a non-resident by an attach-
ment of his property within the jurisdiction. Such proceedings,
however, can operate only in rem, or quasi in rem, upon the pro-
perty itself, and can confer no jurisdiction of the person which
the courts of another sovereignty will respect." Moreover, the
"due process of law" of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that all personal judgments rendered in one of our States against
non-resident citizens of another shall be preceded by personal
service, or its equivalent."
If, however, an individual voluntarily enter within the limits
of a foreign sovereignty, he thereby submits himself to the juris-
diction of its courts, and it may be said that he agrees to abide
the outcome of any action for damages that may be there insti-
tuted against him, and with notice of which he is there person-
ally served. This is true even though his allegiance be of the
most temporary character, as that of a mere transient sojourner
in the country. The law on the subject has been so clearly laid
down in a very recent decision of the Supreme Court of Connec-
ticut that we may be pardoned for quoting from it somewhat at
length. The case was one of a citizen of Connecticut tempora-
rily stopping at a hotel in Birmingham while on a business trip
in England. Process was served upon him just as he was about
to return home. He disregarded it, and judgment went against
89 iI How. 437, 459. The case cited was one infjersonam; but, when the
jurisdiction exercised is one in rem, or guasi in rem, property within the
place of the forum may be subjected to judicial action by construction service
of process authorized by statute. Arnot v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316.
70 Cooper v. Reynolds, 1o Wall. (U. S.) 308; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S.
714; The Mecca, 6 P. D. IO6; Story on Conf. of Laws, Sec. 549.
71 Pennoyer v. Neff, supra; Cooley on Const. Lira., 405. It seemsto be
taken for granted that our national and state constitutional provisions render
substituted service in all cases-even in that of a citizen-ineffectual to bind
personally. Cooley on Const. Lim., See. 403. et seq. But see an interesting
and logical discussion in Beard v. Beard, 21 Ind. 321.
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him in the English court by default. In a suit upon this judg-
ment in Connecticut, the defendant set up a special plea to the
jurisdiction of the foreign court, but it was held bad. Judge
Baldwin said:
"The fact that the defendant was a foreigner, making but a
brief stay in the country, and on the point of leaving it for his own,
did not deprive the courts of England of all jurisdiction over him.
The Roman maxim, Actor sequitur forum rei, if it has any force
in English or American jurisprudence, operates as a permission,
rather than a command. A man who is absent from his domicile
can still be sued there; but he can also be sued wherever he is
found, if personally served with legal process within the juris-
diction where the plaintiff seeks his remedy. The action must
be brought, indeed, in a court to which the defendant is subject,
and subject at the time of suit; but, unless protected by treaty
stipulation or official privilege, he is subject to every court
within reach of whose process he may enter. The Roman law
allowed a non-resident to be sued where he had established a
temporary seat of business, and, in some cases, where he had
simply contracted a single obligation. The common law, so far
as concerns the enforcement of a pecuniary liability, goes
farther, and operates alike upon every private individual who
may be found, however transiently, within the territory where it
is enforced. * * * He [the defendant] put himself under
the power of the court, the moment he entered the territory
which was subject to its authority. Nor did he put himself
under its power simply in the sense that it could issue process
and render judgment against him, which would be of force
within the limits of the territory. To that extent, its judgments
might be valid, though rendered without any personal service,
upon a simple attachment of goods, or by publication. But they
would be mere expressions of the will of the sovereign, and im-
pose no personal obligation which other sovereigns could recog-
nize or enforce. Judgments rendered against a foreigner who is
previously served when personally present stand on a ground
wholly different. These, and these only, so far as actions for
money damages are concerned, are entitled to full respect in the
courts of other countries by the principles of international law.
* * * The defendant accepted the forum, when he volunta-
rily placed himself on English soil, and so came under an implied
obligation to respect such legal process as might be served upon
him there, to the extent of satisfying any resulting judgment
duly rendered for a pecuniary demand. ' "
72 Fisher v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 104, 1o8, io9.
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But personal service without the jurisdiction can amount to
nothing. And if the defendant be shown to have been decoyed
into the jurisdiction for the purpose of being there served with
process, it may be that a case of fraud is exhibited sufficient to
render the whole proceeding void."' But an appearance solely
for the purpose of safe-guarding property whether alreadyin the
hands of the court or liable to seizure on execution, will be con-
sidered as a voluntary one.'
3. Again, it is agreed that foreign judgments repugnant to
natural justice are of no force whatever. And it would seem
that the term "natural justice" may have reference to the sub-
stantive law of the foreign country, 5 though it would more often
denote the method of procedure, and, in this sense, would be
more or less merely synonymous with "due process of law"--an
expression which implies a reasonable notice to the defendant
and a chance to be heard before a competent and impartial tri-
bunal.", The line which separates that which is from that which
is not natural justice must needs be shadowy and indefinite, and
to be determined only in each particular case, in the light of
attendant circumstances, and of the general principles of private
international law. In Bradstreet v. Neptune Insurance Com-
pany I" Mr. Justice Story said:
"It is a rule founded on the first principles of natural justice
that a party shall have an opportunity to be heard in his defense
before his property is c6ndemned, and that charges on which the
condemnation is sought shall be specific, determinate and clear.
If a seizure is made and condemnation is passed without the alle-
gation of any specific cause of forfeiture or offense, and without
any public notice of the proceedings, so that the parties in inter-
est have no opportunity of appearing and making a defense, the
sentence is not so much a judicial sentence as an arbitrary sover-
eign edict. It has none of the elements of a judicial proceeding,
and deserves not the respect of any foreign nation. * * * It
may be binding upon the subjects of that particular nation, but,
upon the eternal principle of justice, it ought to have no binding
obligation upon the rights or property of the subjects of other
73 See Black on Judgments, Sec. goo.
7 4 Voynet v. Barret, 54 L. J., Q. B. 521; Hilton v. Guyot, I59 U. S. 113.
7 Henderson v. Henderson, 6 Q. B. 288.
76 See Price v. Dewhurst, 8 SiM. 279; Shaw v'. Gould, L. P., 3 H. L. 55;
Bradstreet v. Ins. Co., 3 Sumn. 6oo: Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274.
76& 3 Sumn. (U. S.) 6oo.
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nations; for it tramples under foot all the doctrines of interna-
tional law, and is but a solemn fraud, if it is clothed with all the
forms of a judicial proceeding."
How far our courts would go in upholding judgments ren-
dered by the tribunals of barbarous or semi-barbarous countries
is an interesting speculation. An English court has held valid
the title acquired by judicial sale of a British ship in the pirat-
ical state of Algiers."
In this connection maybe noticed judgments rendered abroad
on summary proceedings in derogation of the common law,
which our courts will not enforce.7'
4. The local policy, penal or revenue laws and police regula-
tions of another country, are not to be imported and effectuated
here through the medium of a foreign judgment.
"Such decrees can have, and ought to have, no extra-terri-
torial significance. They rest upon no principle of universal
acceptation, like the obligation of contracts, or the protection of
generally recognized private rights.""'
5. Once more, no action can be based upon a foreign judg-
ment of an interlocutory character, or, indeed, on any that has
not the force of resjudcata in the jurisdiction where rendered.
In order that it may be enforced it must have been a final deter-
mination of the rights of the parties.
"The test of finality and conclusiveness of any judgment,"
said Lord Justice Lindley, "is to be found in the view taken of it
by the tribunals of the country in whih it was pronounced, and
if a judgment leaves the rights of the parties uninvestigated and
77 The Helena, 4 Ch. Rob. 3. Interesting opinion by Sir William Scott.
78 Anderson v,. Haddon, 33 Hun. (N. Y.) 435. In this case it is said that
no foreign judgment will be held conclusive, even when the party charged
appeared, if it is shown that the cause of action was one not known to the
common law, and that the course of procedure did not furnish all the safe-
guards afforded by it; but in the case of Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113,
where it was urged that the defendant in the foreign action had been deprived
of the right of cross-examination, and that various of the common law rules
designed to exclude fraudulent and perjured testimony had not been ob-
served, the court say: "It having been shown by the plaintiffs, and hardly
denied by the defendants, that the practice followed and the method of ex-
amining witnesses were according to the laws of France, we are not prepared
to hold that the fact that the procedure in these respects differed from that in
our own courts is of itself a sufficient ground for impeaching the foreign
judgment."
79 De Brimont v,. Penniman, zo Blatch. (U. S.) 436; The Antelope, xo
Wheat. (U. S.) 66, 123; Ogden v. Folliot, 3 Ter. Rep. 726.
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undetermined, and avowedly leaves their rights to be deter-
mined in some other proceeding, the judgment cannot be treated
here as imposing an obligation which our tribunals ought to
enforce. ""
Of course the courts will never give greater effect to a foreign
judgment than it would have at home.
And furthermore, a judgment in _personam, to be enforced in
an action, must be for a fixed sum of money, and never such
that the obligation to obey it may depend upon the existence or
non-existence of a particular state of circumstances. Our courts
will never stultify themselves by taking cognizance of a case
where the means of enforcing the obligation lie, or may lie,
wholly beyond their control."
6. Having considered the necessity of jurisdiction and
absence of fraud, and certain other requirements affecting the
validity of foreign judgments, we come now to the last, and
perhaps the most important, of our inquiries: How far are they
conclusive on the merits?
In treating of this interesting subject, it will be convenient
to make a customary division of judgments, into those that are
in rem, and those that are in personam.
The distinctive feature of judgments in rem, in our jurispru-
dence, (as distinguished from that of Rome), is that they are
binding, not merely inter partes, but inter omnes, concluding all
the world.8"
Without entering upon a lengthy discussion of the topic,
which would be foreign to our purpose, it may be said, gener-
ally, that the ground upon which this universal validity rests is,
(i) that all persons are deemed to be parties to them; or (2) that
the cause was tried between those who had the exclusive interest
in the question involved.8 Examples of cases coming within the
first principle are decrees of courts of admiralty, in cases of
prize," bottomry, salvage, wages, collision,' or foreclosure of
liens," sales of wreck and derelict under municipal regulations,",
80 Nouvion v. Freeman, L. R., 37 Ch. Div. 244, 255; Burnham V. Web-
ster, i Woodb. & N. (U. S.) 172.
s' Wharton Conf. of Laws, Sec. 804; De Brimont u. Penniman, io Blatch.
(U. S.) 436.
82 Bigelk-w on Estop. (5th Ed.), 45.
88 Ibid, 45, 46, 224: Croudson v. Leonard, 4 Cranch, (U. S.) 434.84 Croudson7v. Leonard, sufira; Williams v. Armroyd, 7 Cranch, (U. S.) 423.
88 The Propellor East, 9 Bened. 76; Harmer v. Bell, 7 Moore P. C. 267.
8 8 Castrique v. Imrie, L. R., 4 H. L. 414.
87 Grant v'. McLachlin, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 34.
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and decrees of probate,"8 while within the latter principle come
decrees confirming or dissolving marriage," or establishing pedi-
gree 10 or illegitimacy."'
Proceedings in attachment, replevin, and the like, are fre-
quently spoken of as being in rein; but, in a strict sense, they
are not. "They bind, at most, only the specific parties to the
action, including of course their successors in right."' "Attach-
ment is simply resorted to in order to take the place of notice or
appearance, in other words, merely to give the court jurisdic-
tion; it is a means, and not an end. ""
It seems to be almost universally held in this country and in
England, that the sentence of a foreign court of admiralty, hav-
ing jurisdiction of the res, and in the absence of fraud, condemn-
ing a vessel as lawful prize, is conclusive, not only of the change
of title, but of all the necessary facts upon which the decision
proceeded. The only exception appears to be in New York,
where the sentence is held to be conclusive as to the title, but
only prima facie evidence of the findings upon which it was
based." So, also, a sentence of acquittal fixes the fact that the
property sought to be condemned is free from all liability to for-
feiture." And it makes no difference if an error of law be appa-
rent on the face of the record." But it is only in regard to mat-
ters essential to the decree that it is held binding," and it will not
88 Bigelow on Estop. (5th Ed.), 245.
89 Bigelow on Estop., 243; Story on Conf. of Laws, Sec. 595.
90 Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. (U. S.) 4o0.
91Blackburn . Crawfords, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 175; Kearney v. Denn, i5
Idem. 51.
9' Story on Conf. of Laws (8th Ed.), See, 592, note a.
98 Bigelow on Estop. (5th Ed.), 49; Woodruff v. Taylor, 20 Vt. 6s; The
Bold Buccleugh, 7 Moore P, C. 267, 282.
94 Black on Judg., See. 8r5; Bigelow on Estop. (Sth Ed.), 22X; Hughes v.
Cornelius, 2 Show. 232; Bernadi v. Motteux, 2 Doug. 575; Croudson v. Leon.
ard, 4 Cranch, (U. S.) 434; But see The Mary, 9 Cranch, (U. S.) 126, 145, and
Brigham v. Fayerweather, r4o Mass. 411, 414.
95Vanderheuvel v. U. S. Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. 451; Durant v,. Aben-
droth, 97 N. Y. 132, 141.
9"McGoun v. Ins. Co., r Story (U. S.) 15 7; The Bennett, x Dodson 175;
Gelston v,. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. (U. S.) 246.
97 Williams z. Armroyd, 7 Cranch, (U. S.) 423; Castrique v,. Imrie, L. R.,
4 H. L. 414.
98 Bernadi v. Motteux, 2 Doug. 574; Fitzsimmons v. Ins. Co., 4 Cranch,
(U. S.) X85; Black on Judg., See. 817.
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be regarded as conclusive, if the grounds of the decision be
ambiguously stated, or do not clearly appear."
This doctrine, that such sentences are conclusive as to the
necessary findings of fact, frequently comes up in inquiries
purely collateral to the judgment itself, especially in suits
against marine insurance companies, where it becomes impor-
tant to know whether the vessel has broken the warranty of
neutrality. In such cases, a finding in a foreign decree of c.on-
demnation of breach of blockade, for instance, would be con-
clusive to absolve the insurers from liability.'
All other valid judgments in rem are binding on all the world
as to what is directly adjudicated, but not, it seems, as to the
facts on which the decision rests."0 Thus, in the case of Ennis
v. Smith,"2 which was an action by persons claiming to be heirs
of General Kosciuszko against the administrator of his estate,
the Supreme Court of the United States held that certain decrees
of courts in Lithuania, establishing pedigree, were, as judg-
ments in rem, evidence against all the world of the matters of
pedigree determined.
Decrees of status generally, when not contrary to a nation's
policy, ought to be recognized everywhere when the parties in-
terested were bona fide domiciled in the country where they were
rendered; on the ground that the foreign court had full jurisdic-
tion over the person, and that the cause was tried between those
who had the exclusive interest in the litigation.
To treat specifically of the various kinds of judgments hZ rem
would be to transcend the scope of this essay. Before leaving
the subject, however, it should be said that, were the courts of
one country to disregard the judgments of the courts of another,
operating in rem upon the persons and things within their right-
ful jurisdiction, not only would great confusion of private inter-
ests result, with a consequent injury to commercial relations,
but such disregard might possibly give rise to international com-
plications. The pronouncement of a judgment in rem is not
merely a declaration of justice between individuals; it is also an
exercise of sovereign power, which it is the duty of all other
sovereignties to respect.
" Bradstreet v. Ins. Co., 3 Sum. (U. S.) 6oo.
S00 Crouason v. Leonard, 4 Cranch, (U. S.) 434; Cucullu v. La. Ins. Co.,
16 Am. Dec. ig.
10 1 See Bigelow on Estop. (5th Ed.), 47; Brigham z. Fayerweather, 14o
Mass. 411.
1o, 14 How. (U. S.) 400.
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At the time of the Declaration of Independence, it was the
established doctrine of the English courts in regard to foreign
and colonial judgments in personam that, when made the basis of
an action for their enforcement, they were to be regarded only
asprimafacie evidence of debt, but that when interposed as a
defense, they afforded a complete exceptio reijudicate.
"It is in one way only," said Chief Justice Eyre, "that the
sentence or judgmetit of a court of a foreign State is examinable
in our courts, and that is when the party who claims the benefit
of it applies to our courts to enforce it. When it is thus volun-
tarily submitted to our jurisdiction we treat it, not as obligatory
to the extent to which it would be obligatory, perhaps, in the
country in which it was pronounced, nor as obligatory to the
extent to which by our own law sentences and judgments are ob-
ligatory, not as conclusive, but as matter inpais, as consider-
ation prima facie to raise a promise. " ""
Since that time, the tide of judicial opinion has turned the
other way, and it is now firmly held that foreign judgments,
though impeachable on other grounds, (which we have already
imperfectly considered), are absolutely conclusive on the merits.
It is true, that in the important and leading case of Bank of
Australasia v. Nias,' T it was a colonial judgment that was in-
volved, and Lord Campbell there expressly based his decision
upon the ground that the defendant might have appealed to the
Privy Council, and thus have obtained a review, saying out of
abundant caution, "how far it would be permitted to a defend-
ant to impeach the competency or the integrity of a foreign court,
from which there was no appeal, it is unnecessary here to in-
quire"; but in the later case of Scott v. Pilkington,"5 this point
of distinction seems entirely to have escaped the court's atten-
tion. That was a case involving a judgment rendered in 'the
State of New York, and the Chief-Justice said:
"It was not denied that, since the decision in the case of
Bank of Australasia v. Nias, we were bound to hold that a judg-
ment of a foreign court, having jurisdiction over the subject-
matter, could not be questioned on the ground that the foreign
court had mistaken their own law, or had come on the evidence
to an erroneous conclusion as to the facts."
los Phillips v. Hunter (x795), 2 H. BL 402. It would lead us too far to
attempt to trace the vacillating course of the English cases. They are ex-
haustively collated and reviewed in Hilton v. Guyot, x59 U. S. 113, and Bige-
low on Estop. (sth Ed.) 256, et seg.
104 x6 Q. B. 7M7, 734-737.
105 2 Best & S. ix.
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Not only is this now the settled law of England, but the
courts have gone further, and hold that such judgments may not
be impeached even when the record clearly shows that the for-
eign tribunal came to an erroneous conclusion in regard to Eng-
lish law. This was decided in Godard v. Gray (187o)."' In
that case, however, it did not appear that the defendant had
called the foreign court's attention to what the English law
really was, and it is quite possible that, in accordance with the
doctrine of a former decision,' a manifest and perverse disre-
gard of the law of England would still be closely scrutinized.
Naturally enough in the early days, the courts of America
were disposed to follow the rule then obtaining in the parent
country, and the judgments of foreign lands and of sister colo-
nies were treated as only primafacie evidence of debt, before
the adoption of the Constitution, and even for some time after-
ward when those colonies had become States.' Thus in Butt-
rick v. Allen (18 i1),1°9 which was an action of assumpsit on a
judgment from Nova Scotia, the court said:
There is no doubt that assumpsit lies upon a foreign judg-
ment, but the judgment is no more thanprimafacie evidence,
and the defendant has all the benefits he would be entitled to in
an action upon the original cause."
There are many others of these early cases which express the
same opinion, but they are all, or nearly all, decisions concern-
ing the validity of sister State judgments rendered before that
question had been settled by the Supreme Court of the United
States, or dicta concerning the force of foreign judgments
thrown out in the course of such decisions.
It would be tedious to enter upon an historical examination
of our law in this connection. New York, Maine and Illinois
have in recent times declared in favor of the -present English
doctrine,lo and within the past year the question has been twice
authoritatively pronounced upon from different points of view,
106 L. R., 6 Q. B. I39; see also Castrique v. Imrie, L. R., 4 H. L. 414.
107 Simpson v. Fogo (i86o), x John. & H. i8.
108 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. Zi3; Bigelow on Estop. (5th Ed.), 264.
109 8 Mass. 273 (18ix).
110 Lazier v. Westcott, 26 N.Y. 146, 150. It should be remarked that the
lengthy discussion in this case regarding the conclusiveness of foreign judg-
ments appears to be entirely obiter, inasmuch as the only questions raised ty
the pleas were purely technical, touching the admissibility of the exemplifica-
tion of the foreign record. Dunstan v. Higgins, 138 N. Y. 70, 74; Rankin v.
Goddard, 54 Me. 28, 55 Me. 389; Baker v. Palmer, 83 IlL 568.
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by the Supreme Court of the United States, and once by the
Supreme Court of Connecticut."
The first case cited, involved a judgment recovered in France
by French citizens against American citizens who had been doing
a mercantile business there. The second was an action by two
parties plaintiff, one a citizen of Illinois, the other a citizen of
Ontario, Canada, against a citizen of Ohio, upon a judgment re-
covered by the plaintiff against the defendant in the Queen's
Bench Division of the High Court of Justice for the Province of
Ontario. In both cases the merits of the original controversy
were drawn in question by pleas, which were held good in the
first instance and bad in the second.
These decisions introduce into our law of foreign judgments
a new principle-the principle of reciprocity. The court did not
content itself with sifting the American and English prece-
dents and drawing its conclusions from them. The question
involved was one, not of municipal, but of international, law, to
be solved by the application of principles common to all civilized
nations.
"International law in its widest and most comprehensive sense
-including not only questions of right between nations, gov-
erned by what has been appropriately called the law of nations;
but also questions arising under what is usually called private
internatioral law, or the conflict of laws, and concerning the
rights of persons within the territory and dominion of one
nation, by reason of acts, private or public, done within the
dominion of another nation-is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice as often as
such questions are presented in litigation between man and man,
duly submitted to their determination. The most certain guide
no doubt, for the decision of such questions is a treaty or a stat-
ute of this country. But when, as in the case here, there is no
written law upon the subject, the duty still rests upon the judi-
cial tribunal of ascertaining and declaring what the law is,
wherever it becomes necessary to do so in order to determine the
rights of parties to suits regularly brought before them. In do-
ing this, the courts must obtain such aid as they can from judi-
cial decisions, from the works of jurists and commentators, and
from the acts and usages of civilized nations."
After an exhaustive examination of all the English and
American authorities and of the doctrines adhered to in foreign
countries, the court came to the conclusion:
"I1 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113; Ritchie v. McMullen, Id. 235; Fisher
v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 9r.
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"That there is hardly a civilized nation on either continent,
which, by its general law, allows conclusive effect to an execu-
tory foreign judgment for the recovery of money. In France,
and in a few smaller states-Norway, Portugal, Greece, Monaco
and Hayti-the merits of the controversy are reviewed as of
course, allowing to the foreign judgment, at the most, no more
effect than of being prima facie evidence of the claim. In the
great majority of countries on the continent of Europe-in Bel-
gium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, in many Cantons
of Switzerland, in Russia and Poland, in Roumania, in Austria
and Hungary, (perhaps in Italy), and in Spain-as well as in
Egypt, in Mexico, and in a great part of South America, the
judgment rendered in a foreign country is allowed the same
effect only as the courts of that country allow to the judgments
of the country in which the judgment in question is sought to be
executed.
"The reasonable, if not the necessary, conclusion appears to
us to be that judgments rendered in France, or in any other
foreign country by the laws of which our own judgments are
reviewable upon the merits, are not entitled to full credit and
conclusive effect when sued upon in this country, but are Prima
facie evidence only of the justice of the plaintiff's claim. In
holding such a judgment, for want of reciprocity, not to be con-
clusive evidence of the merits of the claim, we do not proceed
upon any theory of retaliation upon one person by reason of
injustice done to another, but upon the broad ground that inter-
national law is founded upon mutuality and reciprocity, and
that by the principles of international law recognized in most
civilized nations, and by the comity of our own country, which
it is our judicial duty to know and to declare, the judgment is
not entitled to be considered conclusive. * * * By our law,
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, a foreign judg-
ment was considered as prima facie evidence, and not conclu-
sive. There is no statute of the United States, and no treaty of
the United States with France, or with any other nation, which
has changed that law, or has made any provision upon the sub-
ject. It is not to be supposed that, if any treaty or statute had
been or should be made, it would recognize as conclusive the
judgments of any country which did not give like effect to our
own judgments. In the absence of statute or treaty it appears
to us equally unwarrantable to assume that the comity of the
United States requires anything more."
I's Hilton z. Guyot, X59 U. S. 113.
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This, then, is the doctrine of the Supreme Court of the
United States, and may perhaps be now regarded as the doc-
trine of our country. It is the very reasonable rule, proposed by
Mr. Justice Story, years ago, in his "Conflict of Laws," as
likely, "hereafter to work itself firmly into the structure of
international jurisprudence,""' and it may almost be assumed
that it will henceforth, as cases arise, receive the approval of
many of our State courts."' The fact is not to be overlooked,
however, that the decision in Hilton v. Guyot was only reached
by a majority of one. Mr. Chief-Justice Fuller delivered a very
strong dissenting opinion, and Justices Harlan, Brewer and
Jackson concurred in this dissent. It is conceived to be not
impossible that any two men of equal understanding might well
be led to take different sides on the question. In England the
credit given to foreign judgments does not rest on comity, but
on obligation.
"Where a court of competent jurisdiction has adjudicated a
certain sum to be due from one person to another, a legal obli-
gation arises to pay that sum, on which an action of debt to
enforce the judgment may be maintained. It is in this way that
the judgments of foreign and colonial courts are supported and
enforced. "11"
These often quoted words of Baron Parke have been dis-
paraged as being an outgrowth of the now exploded "Social
Contract" theory, and it has been said that they referred, when
spoken, only to matter of technical pleading;' but they have
repeatedly been reasserted and approved, and are now firmly
engrafted upon the English law as expressing the very founda-
tion upon which the validity of foreign judgments is based.'"
It is admitted in Hilton v. Guyot that a personal judgment "be-
I'sStory Conf. of Laws, See. 618.
114The case of Fisher v. Fielding, involving as it did, an English judg-
ment (like Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U. S. 235), did not require any decision of
this kind. If the court were careful in abstaining from any criticism of the
doctrine of Hilton v. Guyot, they were equally careful to avoid expressing
their approval of it. "The effect to be given to a foreign judgment in .zer-
sonam, for a money demand, must be determined either by the comity of na-
tions, the rule of absolute reciprocity, or the personal obligation resting on de-
fendant. Whichever test may be adopted, the result will be the same, when a
question arises between the courts of England and those of an American State
which was once an English colony."
115 Williams v. Jones, x3 Mees. & W. 628, 633.
116 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 1I3, and argument for appellant.
"I See Godard v. Gray, L. R., 6 Q. B. 139, X48.
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tween two citizens or residents of the country, and thereby sub-
ject to the jurisdiction in which it is rendered, may be held con-
clusive as between them everywhere. So, if a foreigner invokes
the jurisdiction by bringing an action against the citizen, both
may be held by a judgment in favor of either. And if a citizen
sues a foreigner, and judgment is rendered in favor of the latter,
both may be held equally bound. "I" It is only in the case of a
judgment" "purely executory, rendered in favor of a citizen or
resident of the country, in a suit there brought by him against a
foreigner" that the principle of reciprocity is to be invoked.
Now, assuming that it is the province of courts to do justice be-
tween individuals, (having always due regard for local policy),
and not to manceuvre governmental affairs, might not this rule
of reciprocity defeat the very end for which they exist? Because
the courts of another nation refuse to do justice, is that a good
and sufficient reason why our courts should follow in their lead?
It is the glory of our common law that it recognizes no dis-
tinction between the suitors that stand before its altar, but, be
they citizens or be they strangers, metes out justice with an even
hand. "With us, the law of the land protects all who stand
upon it, and whenever a right has been violated, gives a remedy,
without regard to the nationality of the offender."' 19 "The
common law recognizes no distinction whatever as to the effect
of foreign judgments, whether they are between citizens, or be-
tween foreigners, or between citizens and foreigners. In all
cases, they are deemed of equal obligation whoever are the
p a r t i e s . " *P -°
And if it be contended that the principle of reciprocity is an
expedient one to adopt in order to induce such countries as
France to change their attitude towards our own judgments, it
may not be impertinent to quote the words of Chief-justice
Fuller:
"I cannot yield my assent to the proposition that because by
legislation and judicial decision in France that effect is not there
given to judgments recovered in this country which, according
to our jurisprudence, we think should be given to judgments
wherever recovered (subject, of course, to the recognized excep-
tions); therefore we should pursue the same line of conduct as
respects the judgments of French tribunals. The application of
the doctrine of resjudicata does not rest in discretion, and it is
118 Hilton v,. Guyot, suj ra.
119 Fisher v. Fielding, 67 Conn. gi.
120 Story on Conf. of Laws, Sec. 6io.
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for the government, and not for its courts, to adopt the principle
of retortion, if deemed under any circumstances desirable or
necessary. "I"
And again, of Chief-Justice Taney:
"It is truly said in Story's 'Conflict of Laws,' that, 'In the
silence of any positive rule, affirming or denying or restraining
the operation of foreign laws, courts of justice presume the tacit
adoption of them by their own government, unless they are
repugnant to its policy or prejudicial to its interests. It is not
the comity of the court, but the comity of the nation, which is
administered and ascertained in the same way, and guided by the
same reasoning by which all other principles of municipal law
are ascertained and guided.' "122
It seems not unreasonable to believe that, apart from any
"Social Contract" idea, a judgment rendered in a foreign coun-
try, after a fair trial according with civilized notions of proce-
dure, does raise an obligation. The maxim, Judicium redditur
in invitum, is true enough. But all obligations, even express
contracts, are enforced in invitum, otherwise the intervention
of a law suit would be a wholly useless proceeding. Assuredly,
when a man enters into business in a foreign land, or even when
he resides there for a time, as a sojourner, under the protection
of its laws, he impliedly agrees to abide the issue of any litiga-
tion into which he may be called, and wherein all things are
conducted in conformity with the recognized principles of natural
justice. A fortiori is this true of one who enters into contrac-
tual obligations there, into the very structure of which the lex
loci must be interwoven. What ground, then, is there for this
discrimination, in regard to their legal obligation, between con-
tracts made abroad, and the judgments that may be pronounced
upon them?
"In any aspect, it is difficult to see why rights acquired under
foreign judgments do not belong to the category of private
rights acquired under foreign law. Now, the rule is universal
in this country that private rights acquired under the laws of
foreign States will be respected and enforced in our courts unless
contrary to the policy or prejudicial to the interests of the State
where this is sought to be done, and, although the source of this
rule may have been the comity characterizing the intercourse
between nations, it prevails to-day by its own strength, and the
i11 Hilton v. Guyot, '59 U. S. 113, 229; dissenting opinion.
12 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 589.
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right to the application of the law to which the particular trans-
action is subject is a juridical right. ""
Foreign laws are generally said to receive recognition only
through comity-a term which seems often to signify little more
than courtesy to other sovereignties springing from national
selfishness. Let it be granted that the State, owing to the in-
firmities of human nature, must, in its international relations, of
necessity be self-regarding; still, in the transactions of individu-
als, this necessity does not always exist. There is another and
a higher view which says that the laws of foreign countries not
repugnant to our local policy are recognized in our courts, be-
cause, without such recognition, justice between man and man
could not be done."' The Supreme Court itself must have seen
an obligation to obey a foreign judgment, else how could it have
consented to confide the sacred rights of American citizens to the
rule of absolute reciprocity, which applies as well to despotic
military Russia, as to enlightened Great Britain.
On the whole, it appears that the doctrine of England stands
upon far loftier principles than the doctrine of the United States.
Which of the two will prove superior in practical operation is
another question.
There is a further argument for the conclusiveness of foreign
judgments, which is based upon the maxims, Nemo debet bis
vexari pro una et eadam causa, and Interest rei~pubicca at sit finis
litium. Not only would it be unjust to individuals to permit the
reopening of a controversy once fairly tried and settled, after the
original evidence may have become unattainable or lost, but the
public welfare itself imperatively demands that there shall be
some limit set to litigation. A contrary doctrine would injuri-
ously affect the stability of private rights, greatly to the detri-
ment of commercial and business relations, and entail a need-
lessly heavy burden upon the finances of the commonwealth.
In closing. this discussion we cannot do better than quote
again from the decision in the case of Fisher v. Fielding, so
often cited before:
"The maxim, Interest re~oublia ut sit finis li'um, is not re-
stricted in its application to controversies or suits originating in
the State before whose courts it is invoked. It does not rest on
the excellence of any particular system of jurisprudence. It
governs wherever the parties come, in the last resort, before a
128 Chief Justice Fuller in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. I13, 229.
' 4 See note concluding Ch. II. of Story Conf. of Laws (8th Ed.)
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court constituted under an orderly establishment of legal pro-
cedure. No one who has been or could have been heard upon a
disputed claim, in a cause to which he was duly made a party,
pending before a competent judicial tribunal having jurisdiction
over him, proceeding in due course of justice, and not misled
by the fraud of the other party, should be allowed, after final
judgment has been pronounced, to renew the contest in another
country. The object of courts is hardly less to put an end to
controversies than to decide them justly.""
Ernest Knaebel.
125 67 Conn. 91.
